The clone remembers having those attachments, so it does have attachment to the world you were born in.
Let’s say your clone with your memories replaces you, like a Star Trek transporter incident. Your mother won’t be able to tell the difference, your clone won’t be able to tell the difference, and the rest of the world won’t be able to tell the difference. What’s the actual physical difference between your clone remembering your mother and you remembering your mother? Seems to me that nothing actually changed.
It’s no longer me. The clone doesn’t actually have the material connection to my mother, to the historical world we live in. It’s made of different stuff.
Again, for others, it might be able to play the role of “me”. But it isn’t me, will never be me. It will have been created in a new way, and brought into history in a different way.
I think that as historical materialists we need to hold the line on this kind of thing. Just as the bringing into being of a commodity imprints the history, the labor, the life into it, so does the bringing into being (continually and autopoetically) of the self constitute the historical and material conditions of its life.
The material conditions that create the clone are not me. It will never be me even if it “remembers” being me.
Yes but the history of the book is different. The text of Augustine’s confessions is the same but the copy produced by penguin is DIFFERENT from a manuscript produced by a medieval scribe. They have different histories and are different things in the world.
You can’t say that my book and your book are the same. The “text” may be the same, but they aren’t the same thing.
Unless you discount the materiality of life entirely you will never be your clone.
I see what you’re saying, but I think I’d be happy if I got a new book after my old book was destroyed, even if I’d rather my old book not be destroyed. I’ll take the clone body with the clone brain, and I’ll still consider myself alive even if the original is long gone. It’s a new copy of the book, but it’s still the same story.
other people have covered most of my position well enough, i’ll just slip in here and say it wouldn’t be the you having this conversation who thinks she’s alive.
The clone remembers having those attachments, so it does have attachment to the world you were born in.
Let’s say your clone with your memories replaces you, like a Star Trek transporter incident. Your mother won’t be able to tell the difference, your clone won’t be able to tell the difference, and the rest of the world won’t be able to tell the difference. What’s the actual physical difference between your clone remembering your mother and you remembering your mother? Seems to me that nothing actually changed.
It’s no longer me. The clone doesn’t actually have the material connection to my mother, to the historical world we live in. It’s made of different stuff.
Again, for others, it might be able to play the role of “me”. But it isn’t me, will never be me. It will have been created in a new way, and brought into history in a different way.
I think that as historical materialists we need to hold the line on this kind of thing. Just as the bringing into being of a commodity imprints the history, the labor, the life into it, so does the bringing into being (continually and autopoetically) of the self constitute the historical and material conditions of its life.
The material conditions that create the clone are not me. It will never be me even if it “remembers” being me.
I don’t see it. If you copy a book it doesn’t become a different story, just because it’s written on different paper.
Yes but the history of the book is different. The text of Augustine’s confessions is the same but the copy produced by penguin is DIFFERENT from a manuscript produced by a medieval scribe. They have different histories and are different things in the world.
You can’t say that my book and your book are the same. The “text” may be the same, but they aren’t the same thing.
Unless you discount the materiality of life entirely you will never be your clone.
I see what you’re saying, but I think I’d be happy if I got a new book after my old book was destroyed, even if I’d rather my old book not be destroyed. I’ll take the clone body with the clone brain, and I’ll still consider myself alive even if the original is long gone. It’s a new copy of the book, but it’s still the same story.
other people have covered most of my position well enough, i’ll just slip in here and say it wouldn’t be the you having this conversation who thinks she’s alive.
I think that’s for us to decide, isn’t it? As far as I am concerned, as far as she is concerned, we are the same person.
Have you seen Don Hertzfeldt’s World of Tomorrow?
No, but the synopsis definitely sounds relevant!