seaposting [none/use name]

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 4 days ago

Semi-related, since it’s been a while I followed Malaysian politics, but how is the new Anwar government doing compared to the previous BN rule?

It’s not as straight-forward. Basically PH gained power after the 2018 elections but was based on a tricky coalition with certain smaller parties. After the so-called “Sheraton move” in 2020 which involved many members in the ruling coalition defecting to the opposition thereby disrupting the tenuous majority in parliament, lead to PN gaining power with help from BN for 1.5 years.

This temporary alliance was then also beset with problems that lead to the 2022 snap elections. But the problems didn’t stop there because the results again saw a deadlock in which the 3 main coalitions, PH, BN and PN unable to secure a majority of the parliamentary seats. After negotiations, PH finally rose to power with Anwar appointed as PM, with BN supporting his candidacy.

Outside the political spectacle, the government has continued it’s neoliberal trajectory for nearly 4 decades, for example the privatisation of public healthcare and corporatization of GLCs for profit-maximisation. The government has recently given a cash handout of 100RM (~170CNY), a populist measure to dampen the discontent many people on the ground feel despite official statistics of very low inflation. A clear band-aid that does not solve the structural issues that are facing the economy,

As a result, there has been a lot of disappointment within the activist-NGO circuit, even for the NED funded ones, who were hoping for larger reforms that failed to materialize.

I know that the socdem DAP has been completely neoliberalized, are there any left wing forces within the Pakatan coalition government these days?

The socdem DAP has never really escaped it’s “democratic socialist” identity which stands in stark contrast to anti-imperialist Communism and Marxism - from it’s beginnings (as the Malaysian branch of Singapore’s PAP) to it’s current formulation. Although I would admit, it has probably drifted definitively into the neoliberal camp for decades at this point.

I’ve mentioned this before but Malaysia has no existing parliamentary party that is willing to decisively break from neoliberal politics. Malaysia has heavily suppressed and disempowered mass movements that face multiple contradictions upon multiple axes, in which ever since the 80s the Left has never really recovered in terms of popularity and mobilisation. There are perhaps a handful of parties and organizations I can name that truly fit the Left label, but regardless it’s going to be a long road with no straightforward path before a credible Left alternative will rise.

My understanding is that Anwar himself used to be the NED candidate and supported by the US during his political imprisonment by Mahathir, so he’s very much a neoliberal, but has since “rebranded” himself as a repentant opposition leader.

Anwar’s history is mired with complications that go beyond just his NED and Westward-facing smiles. To call him “the” NED candidate simplifies the political situation, which in my opinion is like calling Putin a comprador in 2005. In some regards that is true, but material reality limit a colour revolution style capture of the Malaysian political scene.

Anwar Ibrahim’s first rise to power was through an Islamic activist current in the 70s and 80s, with ideological affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood. His disagreement with Mahathir and subsequent detainment, and extensive engagements within the policy-making circles in the USA is well-known, but consistent with the Malaysian political scene, he does not fall into the classic US-funded comprador politician found in other Global South countries. Because that would be a case of self-inflicted harm that disrupts his own class interests, and I have to give props for the ruling classes here in maintaining some level of cohesion and not committing suicide through US involvement (moreso than it already has).

A fun fact that I also forgot until I was reminded of recently was that Anwar Ibrahim actually proposed to revive the Mahathir’s old ideas of the Asian Monetary Fund 2 years ago.

I think the best way I can describe Anwar Ibrahim’s positions is that he is a product of internal contradictions within the Malaysian political economy as much as the international contradictions. In a way he represents a “new normal” of multipolar neoliberal capitalism where the old is still in the process of giving into the new.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · edit-2 5 days ago

The title is a bit of a mouthful but the relatively short substack post (from the many I follow) serves as a useful tool in linking classic modern Marxist concepts and literature with current news pages in the context of Malaysia

Neoliberalism-as-Neo-Imperialism: Post-13MP Constraints, Economic Dependency, and the Entrenchment of Oligarchy in Malaysia

2nd August 2025

Introduction: Neoliberalism Reloaded in the 13th Malaysia Plan

Malaysia’s 13th Malaysia Plan (13MP) was heralded as a forward-looking framework to guide the country through economic recovery and structural reform. However, its implementation remains deeply constrained by a global order where neoliberalism, under the guise of liberalised trade and tech optimism, acts as a contemporary form of neo-imperialism. This essay draws from Samir Amin’s theory of unequal exchange, dependency theory, and Gramscian analyses of hegemony to frame Malaysia’s structural vulnerabilities—perpetuated by ethnocapital alliances, comprador capital, and collusion with Global North monopoly-finance capital.

remainder

Unequal Exchange and the Myth of Reciprocal Trade Gains

“Trade is not development, especially if it transfers value upwards.” — Samir Amin

Malaysia’s trade diplomacy was recently celebrated with the United States reducing its reciprocal tariff rate from 25% to 19%—a move framed as a diplomatic win. However, as clarified in the MITI statement, critical export sectors such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals are already exempt from new tariffs. Hence, there is no new material gain in terms of value-add or market expansion.

Key Argument: This scenario exemplifies unequal exchange, where the Global South (Malaysia) continues to export labor-intensive intermediate goods at low prices while importing high-value technology at inflated costs—creating a structural transfer of surplus to the Global North.

Reference: Samir Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, 1977.

Further Source: MITI Trade Statement (July 2025)

Comprador Capital and State-Enabled Tech Colonialism

Malaysia’s digital economy push, while ostensibly progressive, is underwritten by state-backed incentives to Big Tech platforms like Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Meta, and Amazon AWS. These corporations receive tax holidays, land grants (particularly in Johor and Cyberjaya), and preferential tariffs for electricity and water—subsidised by public spending.

Key Argument: Comprador technocrats within Malaysia’s GLC ecosystem facilitate this “digital rent extraction” in return for elite brokerage. The rakyat, meanwhile, face increasing cost of living, inflation, and underinvestment in public digital infrastructure.

Reference: Fadiah Nadwa Fikri, “Eliminate the Culture of Worshipping Wealth,” NUS Southeast Asian Centre, 2023.

Data Point: Electricity subsidy expenditure, MOF 2024 report.

Relevant Concept: Sweezy & Baran’s Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review, 1966.

Ethnocapital Clientship and the Preservation of Oligarchy

Economic policy implementation under the 13MP remains tightly bound to ethnocapital alliances, where state contracts, subsidies, and ownership stakes favour politically connected Bumiputera elites. This arrangement both maintains political loyalty and diverts resources away from meritocratic redistribution or innovative sectoral development.

Key Argument: The post-NEP ethnocracy continues to thrive under neoliberalism, which ironically delegitimises state redistribution while reinforcing state-backed rentier structures—creating a dual crisis of legitimacy and inequality.

Reference: Gomez, E.T. et al. (2022). Malaysia’s Political Economy: Ownership and Control of Corporate Capital. ISEAS.

Supporting Concept: Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution and hegemony through clientelism.

Malaysia as a Semi-Peripheral Cog in the Global $114 Trillion Economy

The IMF (August 2025) reports increasing geopolitical tensions, tariff risks, and stagnating multilateral trust in the global economy. Malaysia, with a GDP size constituting less than 0.3% of global output, finds itself trapped in the semi-periphery—dependent on FDI, vulnerable to external shocks, and constrained by domestic debt burdens and productivity stagnation.

Key Argument: Despite its ambitions for high-income status, Malaysia is structurally subordinated to global capital flows and FDI conditions. Its policy room is narrowed not only by fiscal limitations but also by ideological surrender to neoliberal integration.

Reference: IMF Blog, “New Standards for Economic Data,” July 2025. (https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/07/31/new-standards-for-economic-data-aim-to-sharpen-view-of-global-economy)

Theoretical Base: Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Theory

Conclusion: Towards a Post-Dependency National Strategy

The 13MP will not succeed unless Malaysia dismantles its dependency logic—whether on U.S.-China supply chains, Big Tech’s infrastructural colonisation, or the institutional entrenchment of ethnocapital and comprador elites. Only through a radical re-imagining of national development priorities, with a return to social wage policies, public digital infrastructure, and class-based redistribution, can Malaysia reclaim agency from neoliberal-imperialist constraints.

Linkages of Neoliberal Dependency in Malaysia: Capital Entrenchment & Global Tech Hegemony

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 15 days ago

Malaysia won’t bend to external pressure, says PM

For example, if they (foreign powers) claim our bumiputra policy is discriminatory, Malaysia firmly says no. The country stands by its accepted and established national policies

This is an interesting one because there are usually two ways in which “discriminatory” is interpreted.

The first is the standard free market response that foreign equity restrictions is discriminatory to foreign investors. This can easily be seen for the liberalism that it is so there’s not much to say.

The second is a much more sophisticated and particular response unique to Malaysian political-economic history of “Bumiputera” (“Indigenous”) policies. The accusation of racial discrimination has extensive roots in the NGO-liberal discourse in Malaysia. I am thinking of writing more about it in the future but the jist of it is basically: “what if we import American racial liberalism into a context with no basis?” This is how you get USAID, NED and the US embassy funding “anti-racist” programmes in Malaysia. The irony is not lost for anyone with a brain here.

… “In the procurement system, Malaysia must maintain the right to give opportunities to local companies. This is a non-negotiable position in our discussions.

“Therefore, our negotiations with the United States are more meticulous and firmer than usual,” he said, dismissing those who questioned Malaysia’s stand on the US tariffs.

In other news,

Ballooning household debt in South-east Asia: The deindustrialisation trap in Malaysia

The issue is of course that despite the efforts of the government through the New Industrial Masterplan 2030 or National Semiconductor Strategy, their ideological neoliberalism restricts valid policy and foresight to counter deindustrialisation. (Besides the aforementioned imperialist pressure.) Perhaps after the recession that will eventually happen neoliberalism will finally collapse under its own weight - or if the ardent neoliberals lose their political mandate. The grievances down below are steadily rising after all.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 25 days ago

Southeast Asia and the ‘middle democracy’ trap

TLDR: Liberals in Southeast Asia are much more sophisticated in hiding their class affinities than those in the West.

the article with commentary

In Brief

The position of democracy in Southeast Asia has fluctuated since the Asian Financial Crisis, with democratic concerns gaining prominence in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, particularly showcased in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. But a recent shift toward prioritising economic development over democratic values has been observed, largely due to changes in global politics and the retreat of the United States from democracy promotion, leaving Thailand as the only exception to this trend with its continued struggle for political reform.

A familiar trope in the analysis of Southeast Asian politics is that development is a more urgent concern than democratisation. Popular pressures to increase democratic inclusion and protect democratic institutions may periodically arise. But the more fundamental and constant worry of Southeast Asia’s governments and citizens is thought to be making development—not democracy—work.

For the Western observer who live their lives on the throne of the blood and skulls of the colonized, Global South aspirations of development seem idealistic and nonsensical. But when you have lived in the villages tucked away in the jungles, with no running water or electricity, it becomes real, not rhetorical - something material that needs changing.

This was certainly true for the authoritarian regimes that dominated Southeast Asia throughout the Cold War period. Overcoming the historical hindrances and humiliations of colonialism meant that catching up with ‘the West’ or ‘the global North’ became the prime postcolonial imperative in anti-communist authoritarian regimes like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. They all dreamt of following in Japan’s development footsteps. It eventually became true in the reformed communist regimes of Vietnam and Cambodia as well. They sought to accompany China on its path from Second World to First.

For a professor of political science, you seem to jumble your words. The anti-communist states of Southeast Asia were Third World - not Second - and only Singapore was the only country who wanted to uncritically ascend and claim to “First World”. Here is also where falling-back to a generalising “Southeast Asian” umbrella without addressing the specificities that characterise the political-economy of each country results in an analysis without the facts, or in other words, a writing without meaning.

Yet in the quarter-century roughly following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, concerns about democracy came to loom much larger. A ‘regime cleavage’ within the elite and electorate alike thus came to characterise political competition in Southeast Asia’s wealthiest capitalist societies by the early 21st century.

This was especially true in Indonesia, where an exceedingly punishing economic downturn undid Suharto’s personalistic dictatorship and ushered in a competitive multiparty democracy. Malaysia experienced a vicious crackdown on reformist forces in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, but reformist forces refused to fade. Thailand was no stranger to mass democratic protest—popular will prevailed over military rule in 1973 and 1992, with big assists from the widely beloved King Bhumipol Adulyadej. But the Asian Financial Crisis prompted constitutional reforms aimed at enhancing the electoral connection between voters and politicians.

History to liberals marks semi-connected events portrayed to them by mainstream media without any sort of introspection, which is why they are always wrong, having only gotten 5% of the entire picture.

After the wildly popular—and wildly unpopular—Thaksin Shinawatra was toppled in a 2006 coup, Thai politics fractured along the ‘yellow’ side of militarist, monarchist oligarchy and the ‘red’ side of inclusive and energetic populism. Malaysia saw questions of democratic reform rise in relevance with the launching of the Bersih movement for electoral integrity in that same year.

Indonesia’s 2014 and 2019 elections seemed to hold democracy’s survival in the balance, with Joko Widodo the final rampart against strongman Prabowo Subianto’s ascendance to the presidency. Even in Singapore, the historically weak opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party gained headway in the 2010s largely by promising to constitute a solid procedural opposition in the city-state’s pseudo-democratic institutions.

It would be a stretch to say that democracy had displaced development in the driver’s seat by the 2010s. Still, the fate of democracy certainly loomed larger in election campaigns in the first two decades of the 21st century than the final two decades of the 20th.

Democracy in the Global South is a perpetual victim that needs saving from the United States - this I think more accurately characterises the article’s position than the idealistic bubble it tries to insulate itself with.

But now, democracy is firmly back in the back seat. This is of course not merely a regional story. Donald Trump’s second, far more aggressively authoritarian presidency in the United States starting in early 2025 has taken democracy promotion entirely off the global agenda.

This marks a definitive end to a global era. If democratic concerns are to play any meaningful role in any country’s politics, it can only be through domestic dynamics, not geopolitical pressure or transnational diffusion. The ‘democracy versus autocracy’ framing of world politics so favoured by US administrations from Bush to Biden is dead and buried.

Perhaps an indirect admittance that colour revolution tactics elsewhere in the world failed to gained any sort of relevance in Southeast Asia. But regardless, this sort of “apolitical” “democracy promotion” throughout this article absolves the role of the United States in enacting economic siege on Southeast Asian economies, and blames the plight of under-development as merely inevitable. Will this lead to any thorough introspection of what democracy means beside the mainstream liberal understanding of “procedures”?

I doubt it.

Development is again sidelining democracy in Southeast Asia. The United States’ retreat from global leadership means that Southeast Asian nations will now maximise their economic ties to China, Europe and other Asian economies with less geopolitical hesitation. US tariffs on China will likely divert more lucrative investment projects to the region. As China begins transitioning from its unsustainable export-dependent economy to a domestic demand-driven growth model, Southeast Asian exporters will be first in line to feed the world’s most massive market.

Indonesia and Malaysia are currently the most vivid examples of what happens when development sidelines democracy in national politics. Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election saw questions of democracy become almost entirely irrelevant. Prabowo’s nice-guy makeover allowed him to ride on Jokowi’s long coattails—lengthened by Indonesia’s strong economy—to a comfortable victory. In Malaysia, the opposition’s fight to displace the long-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition has produced a government which acts like it has no latitude to pursue deeper democratising reforms. At times it seems as if cost of living is the only political issue that matters in Malaysia, much like in neighbouring Singapore.

How much does this guy make writing articles about how the poors care too much about living and not much about crossing a paper every 5 years?

The fascinating exception to this trend is Thailand. Among Southeast Asia’s upper-middle-income countries, Thailand is at once the least democratic and the one where democracy still matters the most. Young voters in particular remain deeply committed to replacing the military–monarchy alliance with a far more democratic and inclusive political arrangement. In current times when external pressures for democratisation have evaporated, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian middle-income country where homegrown forces are pressing hard enough for a democratic breakthrough to threaten authoritarian elites’ entrenched interests.

You mean the country that suffered the most under the Asian Financial Crisis, now poorer than China, dealing with multiple instabilities at its borders, is the country in which political mobilisation is much more established? Color me shocked!

The lesson is an ironic one. When authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia stonewall on democratic reforms, they keep democracy at the forefront of the political agenda. When they concede even partial democratic reforms, politics is largely reduced to the quotidian demands of cost-of-living politics, which does not threaten political or economic elites in the slightest. The overall picture appears to be a ‘middle-democracy trap’ to accompany the ‘middle-income trap’.

You all get paid to speak nonsense.

which does not threaten political or economic elites in the slightest

The irony is so painful it’s searing my eyeballs.

The narrowing of political discourse between democracy and selective US foreign policy choices is about what I expected for the filth called the East Asian Forum. I critically support Amerikan (and in this case, Australian aswell) Academia in directly stunting and hampering effective countermeasures to Global South autonomy.

Dan Slater is the James Orin Murfin Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan.

Midwest freak needs to go fishing instead of wasting everyone’s time talking about topics outside their intellectual capability.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · edit-2 26 days ago

A lot of articles have been churning out lately due to the Asean Ministers Meeting and the BRICS summit. Here’s some random ones I picked. I’ve also found another article written by another bourgeois-liberal Western academic that I want to laugh at so expect a post on that within the next few days barring I don’t get too busy.

Vietnam promotes comprehensive approach to human rights in ASEAN

Civilizational dialogue a must in turbulent world

Anwar calls on Europe to treat SE Asia as equals, says region won’t accept old hierarchies

ASEAN-EU partnership must be equal, fair, inclusive: Sugiono

Expecting the EU to not be colonizer-brained is a losing gamble.

Malaysia says China will sign Southeast Asia nuclear weapons free zone treaty when documents are ready

Chinese Foreign Minister slams US tariffs on ASEAN as ‘unilateral bullying,’ vows to uphold multilateral trading system with ASEAN

Vietnam proposes three priorities to strengthen Asean’s centrality

Asean accuses “Israel” of ‘openly committing genocide’, demands end to Gaza war

Indonesia’s FM says food security must remain ASEAN Plus Three focus

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 1 month ago

Vietnam as BRICS partner strengthens Southeast Asian, Global South voices

some paragraphs removed for brevity

Vietnam recently joined the BRICS as the group’s 10th partner country. Among member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Indonesia holds full membership in BRICS, while Malaysia and Thailand are official partner countries.

This evolving trend underscores a gradual but notable shift among key Southeast Asian economies toward deeper engagement with alternative global governance platforms beyond the traditional Western-dominated order.

Vietnam’s acceptance into BRICS as a partner country marks a significant development, which increases the likelihood of other ASEAN nations seeking BRICS membership and closer ties with the group.

ASEAN member states’ growing interest in joining BRICS stems, in part, from geopolitical positioning. As ASEAN countries increasingly navigate a complex geopolitical landscape, seeking to balance relationships with major powers, BRICS offers an alternative platform for cooperation outside traditional Western-dominated structures.

Another reason is the economic benefits the membership offers. It provides access to new markets, investment opportunities and technological advancements, which is particularly attractive for developing ASEAN economies.

However, one of the main factors that may hinder the inclusion of other ASEAN countries in BRICS is the “US factor”. Some ASEAN countries maintain strong ties with the United States and may hesitate to deepen relations with BRICS to avoid a potential US backlash.

While BRICS offers an alternative to Western-dominated global financial and governance structures, the calculus for some ASEAN countries is not merely economic, but deeply strategic. These countries often walk a tightrope between maximizing economic opportunities and preserving their established security and diplomatic alignments.

In such contexts, the political-diplomatic cost of aligning more closely with BRICS can be high, especially when BRICS is increasingly perceived as a counterweight to Western hegemony and a challenger to the US-led global order. This is especially true for a country like the Philippines, whose foreign policy now under the present government very much lean toward the US.

Moreover, Vietnam’s inclusion in BRICS as a partner country is highly significant in the evolving architecture of Global South cooperation. Vietnam’s presence expands BRICS’ geographic and developmental diversity.

It represents a mid-sized, rapidly developing Southeast Asian economy that has successfully balanced socialist governance with market reforms. Its inclusion will, to some extent, elevate ASEAN’s visibility within BRICS, signaling a shift toward more inclusive multipolar leadership in the Global South.

Its BRICS partnership enhances connectivity among the Belt and Road Initiative, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and potentially BRICS+financial cooperation, primarily through infrastructure finance via the New Development Bank, and cross-border settlement initiatives that reduce reliance on the US dollar.

Likewise, Vietnam’s inclusion in BRICS symbolizes post-colonial economic autonomy. Vietnam’s history of anti-colonial struggle and post-war development success resonates strongly with other Global South nations.

It stands as a symbol of resilience, economic self-determination, and the possibility of development without strict Western alignment or International Monetary Fund-style conditionalities. This enhances the normative narrative of BRICS as a platform for alternative development models beyond neoliberal prescriptions.

Additionally, Vietnam’s inclusion reflects Hanoi’s balanced, nonaligned foreign policy that bridges ties with both East and West, aligning ASEAN’s outlook with BRICS-led Global South initiatives rooted in sovereignty and development-driven multilateralism.

Vietnam’s BRICS partner status is more than symbolic — it is a strategic elevation of a Southeast Asian voice in reshaping global economic governance. It reinforces South-South cooperation and development, multipolarity, and a more equitable world order. It is also a subtle but strong message to the West: The Global South is organizing itself on its own terms.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 1 month ago

The “Israel”-Singapore connection

I would have written a much longer post, but I was brought to attention by this nifty post (archived link) by the “Israeli” trade mission to Singapore which sums it all up quite well:

Singapore has a remarkable story to tell, and paradoxically this south east Asian city-state has quite a lot in common with [the Zionist Entity], a small nation with a history of struggle and resilience. The two small nations have populations comprised of immigrants [the Zionists admitted it themselves which is somewhat hilarious] with different cultures and customs, surrounded by large countries with their own political and ethnic tensions. Both of these small nations have managed against all odds to turn themselves in a single generation from poor, underdeveloped markets to global economic powerhouses with advanced infrastructures, skilled and highly educated workforces and ambitious entrepreneurs. Singapore has grown to become a global financial hub and an Economic giant in a single generation.

The thing to realize is, what the anglophone Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore hate more than sinophone Chinese people, are the Muslims, but especially Malay-Muslims, who rejected their liberal secular capitalism. Their nation-building myths are quite similar, which justifies Singapore’s hefty military budget - larger than every other Southeast Asian country, both in per capita and absolute terms.

A true liberation of the peoples of Southeast Asia necessitates the fall of the financial capitalists, chiefly represented by the largest banks in Southeast Asia, all based in Singapore. That’s why a lot of hysteria historically propagated here are based on “Indonesian” and “Malaysian” terrorists and supporters who’d like to see the downfall of “Singapore”. Nowadays, the rhetoric is a bit more muted, but echoes of this Islamophobia show-up from time to time.

Christmas Eve, 1965, is the unofficial date of the start of the ‘love story’ between Israel and Singapore, an affair that was kept a deep, dark secret. The international press, like the Israeli media, tried to bring the tale to light. Occasionally, scraps of information leaked out; some were published, some were denied, many were disregarded. The fear that the ties would be terminated if they became public knowledge had its effect. Israel imposed a total blackout on the story and the secret was preserved.

But ultimately the mysterious history between Israel and Singapore came to light. In his book, “From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000,” published in 2000, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father and its first prime minister, disclosed the secret that had been kept for almost 40 years: It was the Israel Defense Forces that established the Singaporean army. Lee wrote, “To disguise their presence, we called them `Mexicans.’ They looked swarthy enough.”

To link it to a current news article: S’pore increased its security posture amid rising tensions from Iran-Israel conflict: Shanmugam

People in this region, other regions, or extremist organisations might want to make a point against Israeli, American or other Western assets, he said, adding that there could be attacks from the far right on Muslim assets…

If Singapore is ever attacked, it will make international headlines, he said. There is a possibility of attacks on both sides, he said, either by the far right attacking Muslims, or representatives of Muslim countries including Iran, and attacks on Western assets – American, European or Israeli.

“So we have increased our security posture, working off different scenarios, but you know, you can never be absolutely sure,” he added.

Israel-Hamas conflict a ‘reminder’ for Singapore that it has national interests at stake: Vivian Balakrishnan

This quick ejaculation of “terrorism” when it comes to West Asian or Islamic related foreign policy remains a defining motto of the Singaporean government’s continual targeting of (Malay-)Muslim people, in a “we care about terrorism, but especially from the muslims” sense and also that of it would be “bad for business” since it would harm the hard-fought “social harmony”.

“This episode is also a reminder to all Singaporeans that we do have our national interests at stake … We must reject terrorism in all its forms. No excuses, no ifs, no buts, no short-term political advantage. Reject terrorism. If attacked, all of us here must give the government of the day the ability to exercise the right of self-defence,” said Dr Balakrishnan, supporting the motion.

“But even when it does so, we will expect the government of the day to uphold international law. And as Singaporeans, we will continue to extend humanitarian assistance and protection to all civilians. We should support the peaceful resolution of disputes. And we must nurture and protect our own precious cohesion and harmony.”

The misused word “harmony” crops up again. Wonder if they’ll stop using this tired phrase. Clearly the harmony didn’t apply to those that didn’t fit into their vision of Western Modernity.

And a quick note about the current Foreign Minister:

I would say it is expected, and it is, but still embarrassing.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 1 month ago

Economic Watch: ASEAN integration drives development of independent regional financial system, analyst says

“The push for the use of local currencies has been ongoing for some time, as it helps strengthen the economic integration of ASEAN member states – an important goal that ASEAN seeks to pursue. In fact, other regions are also moving away from relying too heavily on a single foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar, as external interest rates and shifting government policies may cause significant volatility in currency exchange,” she explained, adding that volatility is undesirable in any business.

…

“The Regional Payment Connectivity (RPC) initiative was first established to strengthen payment connectivity among the five ASEAN members, notably Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. To date, the initiative has expanded to include central banks of Vietnam, Laos, Brunei and Cambodia,” she said.

Lee also noted that the ASEAN push for local currencies and reduced dependency on external monetary systems has gained momentum amid growing awareness of the risks posed by relying on the U.S. dollar.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 1 month ago

I find it funny how some Malaysian states banned the use of single-use plastics years ago and are planning to phase-out use nationally by 2030 but we continued to accept Western plastic waste.

Malaysia will stop accepting U.S. plastic waste, creating a dilemma for California

Malaysia will ban plastic waste imports from the U.S. starting Tuesday because of America’s failure to abide by the Basel Convention treaty on international waste transfers, in a move that could have significant consequences for California.

Malaysia emerged as a major destination for U.S. waste after China banned American waste imports in 2018. California shipped 864 shipping containers, or more than 10 million pounds of plastic waste, to Malaysia in 2024, according to the Basel Action Network, an advocacy group. That was second only to Georgia among U.S. states.

Malaysia to set stricter plastic import controls

According to U.S. Census Bureau data, the country exported 35,316 tons of plastic scrap to Malaysia in 2024. United Nations Comtrade data shows that from 2021-2024, Malaysia received more plastic scrap imports from around the globe than any other non-OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) country.

…

“Our people and environment in Malaysia have suffered greatly from the pollution caused by imported plastic and electronic waste,” says Wong Pui Yi, BAN researcher from Kuala Lumpur. “Other countries in Southeast Asia are likewise being harmed by foreign plastic waste daily. We sincerely hope that exporting countries will help us put a stop to waste dumping and trafficking.

“But for these new regulations to be successful, the government must enforce them transparently, swiftly prosecute those who violate the law and close any loopholes that may arise, including clamping down on corruption. We must remain vigilant and continue to spot-check the system with intelligence-led searches and seizures.”

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

Mahathir is indeed unique in Malaysian politics, because he was the first Prime Minister to not be of royal origin and being born from peasants. As part of the up and coming Malay-Muslim bourgeoisie within UMNO, against the traditional British-aligned feudal bureaucrats back in the 60s and 70s, his firebrand speeches does seem quite anti-imperialist for those unaware. However, Malaysian foreign policy had already shifted east-ward and maintained this position since Tun Abdul Razak, where Mahathir was really just riding the coat tails of.

I also do think generally his anti-semitism is usually overstated especially in Western media. It plays only a small role in the grand scheme of things.

As for his Malay-Muslim supremacy, that’s a big one because for a lot of those on the left, the creation of the comprador Malaysian nation-state was already as right-wing as you can get, especially with the secession of Singapore. I have written before about the class forces that led to this secession, and so I won’t focus too much on it here but the reason I bring it up is that a lot of Malaysian liberals of any racial background, have this false idea that Mahathir was the main progenitor of racialism (racism), and that prior to his premiership there were little-to-no racial tension. This was definitely not the case.

I’d say the key contributor to rising racial tension was the failure of left-wing parties and organizations to consolidate and gain power, and of course there is a ton of reasons for this, but just to name one example, Barisan Sosialis in the 60s and 70s were the premier left-wing party that was composed of a unity between Malay-Muslim farmers and Chinese labourers. Their fall lead to a resurgence and continuation of racial-baiting in the political scene and myopic race-based party decision-making.

Furthermore, now to mention the liberals, they too had facilitated racialism within the country despite their pretentiousness and claims of being anti-racist. This is because of their misunderstanding of racialism and the causes of it within Malaysia - which has always been because of unequal land distribution, colonial-era relations of production and British-origin ideological divide and conquer.

Now the liberals have built up quite a large propaganda machine that over-exaggerates racial difference and racial tensions to practically scare voters into voting for them. It’s two sides of the same coin.

And so to call Mahathir right-wing because of his Malay-Muslim supremacism is really meaningless to those on the left here. A lot of the modern-day Malaysian political establishment and the many-many parties are right-wing by that definition, for none actually seek to reorganize the relations of production and actually end the root causes of racialism.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · edit-2 2 months ago

On your last point, 100%.

He still continues to this day, nearing 100 years old, I wish he’d just call it quit lol.

I don’t know whybut many Asian media news sites continues to quote his words like he has any relevance.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

Agreed with practically everything you said. The AFC was definitely an engineered attack against SEA to disrupt EA-SEA integration, but interestingly enough I would say lead to the rise of labour organization and consciousness in Indonesia, with the presidentship of the progressive Abdurrahman Wahid, before his prompt ousting of course but that’s a different story.

Although there are small details I’d contest.

while instituting neoliberal mass privatizations to benefit his own cronies.

He had quite a flip-floppy industrial policy but in his first couple terms he did pursue import-substitution industrialization, especially for transportation. Only in the later years did he then ran on a neoliberal platform (which lead to the rise of the current opposition party of PAS).

socially conservative

I don’t agree with the use of this phrase to describe Malaysian or Asian social beliefs because it mischaracterises the class positions and historical-cultural reasons for why populations in the Global South would seem “backward” compared to bourgeois-liberals in the West. (A lot of it is just Western chauvinism aswell).

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

Malaysia’s current geopolitical trajectory

Sitting at one of the most important waterways in the world - the strait of Melaka, the country hosts the 2nd largest Chinese diaspora, 3rd largest Indian diaspora and largest Indonesian, Bangladeshi and Nepali diaspora. One thing to know is that Malaysian foreign policy never strays too far from home.

It has now been a few years since the 2022 General Election, where a lot of the foreign alternative media was highlighting US influence in the opposition coalition and a potential westward turn. But unfortunately to them, lacking in dialectical materialism and influenced by Eurocentrism, they never actually understood the material and historical contexts that shape Malaysian politics.

remainder

To be clear, there is clear evidence of US involvement in aspects of the opposition. This is inevitable, Malaysia has a large professional English educated middle class owing to British colonization and many who aspire to be professional activists in the NGO industrial complex. The government’s continuation of colonial-era policies of unions and radical political organization meant that in modern-day Malaysian society there are really two avenues for those that want to be politically active: fall under the bureaucracy of parliamentary parties or go through ‘independent’ NGOs in “civil society”. However, this also implies that the past ruling coalition of nearly 50 years as somehow the anti-imperialist or atleast anti-US position. This isn’t the case.

Brief background on Malaysian Foreign Policy

Malaysian foreign policy has stayed remarkably consistent despite changes of government. This is due to the position of Malaysia in the global world economy, where through it’s colonial history and subsequent independence through build-up of native industries, it anchors Malaysian foreign policy and dissuades large changes. As such a lot of the country’s foreign policy hedges on free trade and ensuring domestic political stability and openness to foreign investment. This status-quo remains comfortable for most of the national bourgeoisie. That said, continual pressure from the diverse masses and popular classes ensure that the government could never take an outwardly pro-West position.

In practical terms this means broad alignment with Global South and Islamic interests, despite the prevalence of comprador classes. This means a firm anti-Zionist stance, extensive economic and cultural co-operation with China, close historical and cultural ties with Indonesia and India, and engagements with internationalism through the Non-Aligned Movement and others. It has one of the most progressive foreign policies in Southeast Asia, or at-least in the ASEAN-5, especially concerning China.

Back to the present

The government is now in the process of drafting the 13th Malaysia Plan - the next 5-year plan for 2026-2030, which is when Malaysia is finally forecasted to reach high-income status according to World Bank classifications. This economic development is what I attribute to as the cause of the fracturing and instability of the Malaysian political scene - the fall of Barisan Nasional and rise of Pakatan Harapan and Perikatan Nasional. It represents a shift of power from the old ruling classes to the aspiring and modern national bourgeoise and petite-bourgeoisie, represented by the new or rising political parties, who grew and responded to an environment nearing the end of the Cold War, at the midst of neoliberalism’s establishment. The “radical change” as hoped and expected by the NGOs, Western and Alternative media never happened - which was to no one’s surprise except the liberals.

The current government is currently pursuing a lot of fiscal reforms, while echoing neoliberal phrases that has become all too common. This isn’t especially new - this is merely a continuation of neoliberal policies since the 1990s, before any large changes within the Malaysian parliamentary scene. Generally, neoliberalism in the country has never taken a fully radical turn like that found in Argentina. For parts of the national bourgeoisie, privatization means a loss of their own class’s accumulation, and so neoliberalism trickles in targeting particular industries that maximizes their own racial-class gain. The so-called “third position” found in many semi-peripheral global south countries.

The current Prime Minister does have more of an assimilationist foreign policy rhetorically, especially when compared to some of the previous prime ministers. It falls quite well in line to the coalition’s class base of “sensible” and “smart” (read “business friendly”) policymaking, but again this falls quite in line with past precedent of telling the West what it wants to hear but never actually acting on everything said. The “liberal reformer” seemingly is not much of a reformer after all - but he definitely fits the liberal bill though.

To give another example, he echoes decades old refrains from neighbouring Singapore - whereby the Palestinian cause is “divisive” that threatens “social harmony”. The context of this is that there have been continuous protests and mobilizations for Palestine, especially after October 7th, with demonstrations infront of the US embassy in particular. Sometimes organized by left-wing organizations, sometimes by mainstream political parties - often by the new opposition after the liberals gained power (especially that of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia).

This binary understanding of the role of religion and race is part and parcel of the government’s liberal minded coalition when it comes to racial relations - too simple, sometimes naive. Don’t mistake this rhetoric as being pro-Zionist though, for that is an untenable position in Malaysia. Just recently the Prime Minister emphasized the need to speak against Israeli aggression and crimes in Gaza and Iran and maintaining “centrality” (neutrality), not relying on any one country too much.

What holds for the future?

The so-called rise of “protectionism” has put Southeast Asian economies in a somewhat lucrative position through the China+1 strategy and others. This in effect has risen the trade and foreign investment with the US but it remains to be seen if this foreign investment can be sustained or will actually yield long-term benefits. Malaysia will continue straddling this neutral position, but for a majority of Malaysian policymakers, dealing with the US is merely an economic necessity, but does not hold any of the cultural, political or historical significance like it does with China. Over the longer term, Asian trade and investments will only continue to increase in relevance, with the flagship BRI project, the East Coast Rail Link, on track to finish by next year, bringing needed development to deprived east coast communities and enabling another potential rail link to Thailand.

The Malaysian establishment’s continual acquiescence to Western Capital and unwillingness to be at the forefront of a Global South alternative will undoubtedly continue to roadblock further prosperity and harm the country when the middle-ground becomes impossible, giving further ammunition to those outside the current ruling coalition.

To reiterate what I have wrote in the past, this means that Malaysia can only lean more East as time goes on. It is simply unfeasible for Malaysia to shift West. Economically, politically, culturally, and historically. Do not believe the “analysis” of those that have only stepped foot in this country to visit the beaches. All signs are leading to greater Eurasian and especially ASEAN integration.

And to connect it to current events, having never recognized the Zionist Entity, the country has called the “Israeli Zionist regime” strikes on Iran a “flagrant violation of international law” but falls short of naming the key supporter of “Israeli” aggression, the US of A. Furthermore, Malaysia-Iran relations are friendly although minuscule. In the long-term, I do see growth as the US empire weakens due to both being Islamic countries and high potential for co-operation in many industries, but especially in oil and gas.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

That specific comment on comprador diaspora refers to the infamous Indisch peoples , the mixed-race compradors of the Dutch East India now residing in the Netherlands. See for example “Racial apartheid continues, targeting Indonesian war victims”.

I definitely agree that Indonesia, the largest and yet one of the poorest in Southeast Asia, face numerous class divides of multiple levels, both nationally, and sub-nationally, especially with regards to East Timor and West Papua.

As for the rest of what you said, of course it is true, and the film takes the point-of-view of those involved in the massacres, in which they have already justified it all in their heads - they wouldn’t be alive to that day otherwise. The historical tragedy and trauma of the destruction of the Parti Komunis Indonesia can not be understated, and the further massacres as well.

I said what I said, because in postcolonial societies there is resistance to colonization and also submission to colonization.

For Indonesia, decolonization has been part of our daily life, we have been doing it every day, in all aspects of life, economics, education, technology and sociocultural. The Western domination is everywhere and we fight it every day. In its true sense the term decolonization puts the experience of the (ex) colonized and oppressed people in the center. For Indonesia, decolonization is not just an agenda to look for truth, it is much bigger than that. To be an independent country we have to turn away from the Western guidance and get back what the colonizers took from us. We must re-own the term decolonization again and start to enlighten the Dutch how to decolonize their mind.

Indonesia is indeed a sick society, a country with scars etched by colonization, but what I won’t accept is that Indonesia has no form of agency from Western Capital that we can plainly see through their interactions and relations with Russia and China as part of the Global South semi-periphery.

The country is suffering from the contradictions of the past and present but that does not negate the atrocious Eurocentrism when Indonesian history is talked about. It’s own unique cultural history that is intertwined with other Southeast Asian nation-states and continues to be an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist force within Indonesia, and although many were and continue to be silenced, aspects of their continual sacrifice can still be seen in the present day.

That is what I am trying to highlight when I say that Indonesian history is unique, because despite of what you mention, Indonesia still takes a neutral stance to the modern-day US-China rivalry. China has been Indonesia’s largest trading partner since 2005, 20 consecutive years. That in on itself suggests something more going underneath the surface. But a lot does not appreciate this history, and only look at traumatic events in the past without actually moving the discourse forward to present-day realities.

For an example of what I am saying, see this article for example, “International Discussion: Building International Solidarity Against Militarism in Indonesia”

and

“Indonesia’s Probable Foreign Policy Shift from the West under a Prabowo Administration”

This gives a part of the analysis, but many still need to be carried out and importantly practiced so Indonesia can finally move away from a dark period of it’s history.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

Ah apologies, I didn’t mean to come off too strong. I was still pissed off at the article - let’s use that as the excuse.

The point of my reply was to emphasize that there are anti-imperialist and independent forces within each country, but it is very easy to paint Southeast Asian countries as sinophobic and fall into pessimism when this is not nearly the case, especially with the South China Sea issue.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · edit-2 2 months ago

I think a lot of anti-Chinese sentiment in the Philippines is merely manufactured through co-ordinated media warfare and does not reflect the realities of beliefs of people on the ground. My filipino comrades can clarify this further, but from what I know, yes there may be millions, but for a region with nearly 600million people, and a country of 100million, even tens of millions still does not amount to a majority. A sizeable minority at best.

Indonesia is a unique case in that they do not actually have any overlapping SCS claims because they don’t actually neighbour the South China Sea. I would also say out of the major Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is the only postcolonial country without a sizeable comprador diaspora or colonial-era Western educated comprador elite with sizeable power. That isn’t to say there aren’t comprador and reactionary forces within Indonesia, but there has not been a complete Western ideological capture of educational institutions within the country. They definitely do not subscribe to Eurocentric perversions of International Relations and foreign policy, which is what my critique is specifically based on. Talks of the Bandung spirit still lives strong.

Malaysia, well that’s where I am from, and I have nearly finished editing an essay on Malaysian foreign policy. And again, contrary to this weird assumption that postcolonial countries are only filled with pro-colonizer compradors, being Anti-West in Malaysia is the norm. You talk to a random guy on the street and chances are they’d praise Russia before they’d have anything positive to say about the US. There is a decent comprador population in Malaysia of course, but most of their concerns are funnelled through domestic policy issues and NGOs, and rarely does the mainstream and comprador media here talk about the South China Sea, especially with the sort of veracity and explicit anti-China bias you find in the West.

It is a complete fabrication made to enthuse the War profiteers than something that will actually lead to all-out instability (unless through US provocations by proxy of the Philippines and Taiwan).

Edit: I was wrong about Indonesia not having claims in the SCS, for I thought they had already solved the disputed claims diplomatically but actually the “North Natuna Sea” as coined by the Indonesian side still remains disputed territory. Although under the new Indonesian administration, Indonesia seemed quite happy with China’s joint development proposal, in which I generally personally agree with aswell.

But regardless, the lack of news being raised about this signifies it’s non-importance, especially considering from what I know there has been no updates on the overlapping claims of Malaysia-Indonesia.

seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.net · 2 months ago

I was going to write a proper response to another Western article on the SCS but they all are so lame and predictable.

China militarizing sand blah blah blah.

And then the common made up theory is that’s why these SEA nations are “hedging” and “balancing” between great powers.

It’s all so tiring. Westerners managed to end one war in the ducking 1600s and they think they know anything about international relations or statecraft. And I am especially raging at Amerikans whose country barely existed for 300 years thinking their decades old “expertise” can navigate millenia old cultures and history. Yes I really care about what a Guy in Baltimore thinks about the South China Sea issue.

A Response

The issue with a lot of those in the field international relations is that they can’t ever escape their Eurocentric pretensions and understandings. In the article they try to take an ideological “neutral” “understanding” of the South China Sea by evoking very tired concepts like “hedging” and mistakenly (or purposefully) project their own impressions and dynamics of Southeast Asian relations with China, and so they use the terms like “aggressive” and “great power”, when truthfully no one actually gives a fuck (except maybe VietNam) and no one in Southeast Asia ever uses those term, unless they have been groomed into Western institutions and education.

Literal Amerikan Geopolitical propaganda.

No one ducking lives there you dumb fucks. Are the fish victims of Chinese Imperialism? Perhaps their migration signifies hedging to US Navy boats. And actually I can hear one fish cry out, “save us from being victims of really good hotpot”.

Every accusation is projection and etc.