thefirstcircumnavigator [none/use name]

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Cake day: March 15th, 2024

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  • Understanding indigeneity in Malaysia

    Indigenous politics in Malaysia may exhibit certain characteristics common to other places but what sets it apart is the nature of it’s colonization, where instead of a large settler population migration, a negotiation was had between the pre-existing feudal system and the oncoming colonial architects of so-called colonial capitalism. This negotiation prevented large-scale settler movements but paved the way for the import of large numbers of labourers from other parts of the British Empire, particularly that of India and China. Furthermore, this slow march was also characterized by the prevention and restriction of intra-“native” trading, which necessitated the rise of middlemen consisting of neighbouring “non-natives”, mostly comprador classes.

    I have alluded before that indigenous politics may be more equivalent to “nativism” found in the US, but even that does not capture the full story.

    According to Ethnologue, Malaysia with a population of only 33million, have 111 indigenous languages, with 21 non-indigenous, and 32 “unestablished” but assumed to still have prominence. This does not include the well-known Englsih creole of “Manglish”, the Malaysian “Singlish” equivalent. Malaysian Malay is the standard and official language of both state (rumi, latin alphabet) and religion (particularly in Jawi, arabic based alphabet), while English has semi-official status. One fun fact is that Malaysia is the only country outside of China to have a curriculum up to high school based fully in Chinese.

    I bring this up to set the tone in understanding the diversity of both thought and practice of indigeneity and racialism in the country.

    remaining so it does not take up the entire mega

    Here’s I’ll try to characterize the type of people/arguments that take a position against or for an indigenous politics in this country, as means to better understand what it means to be indigenous here.

    “native” vs “indigenous”

    • in Malaysia, 2 words can be used for “indigenous”, “bumiputera” and “pribumi”, with “bumiputera” being the official term
      • in contrast to bumiputera, a common slur for non-natives is “pendatang” (visitors)
      • some Orang Asli and Orang Asal “aboriginals”, argue that Malay-Muslims are “bumiputera” but they are not “pribumi”
        • Orang Asli are Austronesian and Austroasiatic speakers that did not fully assimilate/integrate into mainstream Malay culture, found in the Peninsular hinterland, and retains certain aspects of their own language, culture and religion
        • Orang Asal includes Orang Asli, and mainly non-muslim or mixed religious ethnic groups found in Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia).
    • bumiputera itself was a “new” term defined in the 1980s superseding “Malay” as the catch-all “indigenous” term to include non-muslim natives (Thai, some Orang Asli, Sarawakian, Sabahan ethnic groups mainly) and hybrid cultures (Peranakans and other “mixed” peoples).

    So-called Pan-Malayism

    • the first type is those that often emphasize Austronesian roots and a pan-maritime Southeast Asian identity
      • sometimes may discount even Islamic history or “Arabization” in the archipelago as non-indigenous, “foreign”
        • this often imported anti-Arab liberal ideology is for those that want to be seen as “one of the good ones”
    • the second type is those that emphasize Islam as basis of this unity
      • this is mainly confined to Malaysia, although has some relevance in other Southeast Asian countries.
      • sometimes confined to just the “Malay-Muslim” racial identity
    • Sometimes you will see people specify Malay as “Malay-Muslim”, to differentiate it’s use in mainstream racial identification and the much longer and diverse history of “Malay” which had orientalist origins during the intensification of European colonization. This distinction does not necessarily undermine the Islamic component of being “Malay”, compared to the previously mentioned orientalist interpretation.

    “indigenous” as not real

    • often taken by some of the more liberal minded “non-natives”, they argue that a true native people does not exist because even “Malays” were migrants from Indonesia thousands of years ago
      • The so-called “most liberal” position you can take (it is definitely liberal but not as much as some others that I have discussed)
      • sometimes only claim Orang Asli and Asal as indigenous
    • we are all one people kumbaya type beat
      • includes a lot of the “I don’t see race” and “meritocracy” people

    Contested and political

    • indigenous and racial politics are heavily interlinked in the country

      • it is contested because qualifying for “bumiputera” status accords you with certain affirmative action policies, and government benefits
      • the infamous “NEP”, accorded a bourgeois Malay-Muslim supremacy but at the same time intertwined the state with economic development
        • this is also why neoliberalism’s most extreme policies never had social-economic bearing in Malaysia
    • the meanings have changed and will continue to be contested

      • different groups and political projects ran their own definition of “Malay” and “indigenous”, usually dependant on their class relationship with the economy.
      • in the past, bumiputera status was used to try sway votes, such as that for Indian Muslims a few years ago, and the aforementioned 1980s redefinition.
      • just recently, a Sarawakian politican argued that Chinese people in the state should qualify for bumiputera status, due to their longer presence in the state compared to others.

  • I love reading delusional Australian-authored articles and papers because they think they know so much about Southeast Asia due to their proximity, but tend to have the most alien and westoid-brain conclusions.

    US tariffs push Southeast Asia into China’s arms - The Australian (archive)

    One likely reason for Donald Trump coming down so hard on Southeast Asian nations is they are seen to have aided and abetted Chinese efforts to circumvent US trade sanctions.

    article

    Southeast Asian nations are scrambling to mitigate the potentially devastating impact of the Trump administration’s tariff punishment amid expectations of mass job losses and warnings the move cedes victory to Beijing in the US-China competition for regional influence.

    The governments of Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia – three export nations deeply reliant on the US market – all called for calm as they worked on responses to Thursday’s shock imposition of 46 per cent, 36 per cent and 49 per cent tariffs respectively in the hope of negotiating them down in coming weeks. But Cambodia’s commerce ministry said on Friday the tariffs were “not reasonable”, pointing out US imports into the impoverished country were taxed at an average rate of 29.4 per cent, and that US consumers would suffer from higher-priced clothing produced in its garment factories.

    Singapore announced a possible downgrade of full-year growth forecasts on the back of Thursday’s worse than expected tariff announcements, while Malaysia said it would focus on multilateral trade deals such as the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (which the US opted out of), and diversifying its export markets.

    None of the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations states has threatened reciprocal trade measures. But the Indonesian government’s initial reaction was telling.

    While Jakarta has promised to simplify regulations such as Halal Islamic compliance rules that could be deemed non-tariff barriers, a presidential spokesman also suggested the White House-instigated turmoil vindicated Prabowo Subianto’s haste in joining the China-led BRICS group of developing nations within days of his inauguration.

    “This step strengthens Indonesia’s position in international trade,” he said, as did Indonesia’s membership of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which included all ten ASEAN nations plus Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Regional experts are now warning the US risks ceding broader regional influence by pushing ASEAN and China closer together on trade. “It hands a pretty significant victory to China for the obvious reason that the US is effectively cutting ties with these countries,” said Lowy Institute International Economics Program director Roland Rajah, adding the US withdrawal also undermined Australia’s efforts to help Mekong states diversify their trade relationships away from China. “Most countries in the region are export driven and you’re taking the biggest market off the table,” he said.

    “No one wants to call them out straight away because everyone is hoping to make a deal but eventually you can imagine a massive backlash as a result of economic dislocations and the social and political problems that brings.”

    Even if the US eventually did lower its tariffs, the immediate effect would be to stall further investment causing a “tonne of damage”. Baseline 10 per cent tariffs on all US imports will take effect on Saturday, and higher reciprocal tariffs on individual countries from next Tuesday, giving no time for businesses to adjust their supply chains.

    Evan Feigenbaum, an Asia expert and vice-president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said on X the tariff announcements meant “the US is pretty much done in Southeast Asia”.

    “The region is filled with pragmatists who can and do navigate all kinds of crazy stuff from outside powers,” he said.

    One likely reason for Mr Trump coming down so hard on Southeast Asian nations is they are seen to have aided and abetted Chinese efforts to circumvent US trade sanctions.

    At a recent press briefing, a White House official claimed Beijing had “turned Cambodia into the most important transhipment hub that Communist China uses to evade our tariffs”. Vietnam has been the main beneficiary of the China-Plus-One strategy, but Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia have also benefited from companies shifting some manufacturing and sourcing operations out of China in order to avoid US trade sanctions on Beijing. Chinese manufacturers were not the only ones to do so, however, with plenty of US, EU and Japanese firms also setting up shop in Southeast Asia.

    “Rather than primarily serving as a backdoor for Chinese exports, Vietnam should instead be seen as playing an important and helpful role in diversifying global supply chains away from China,” a Lowy Institute report said last month. In the wake of Chinese AI firm DeepSeek’s apparent technology leap, Washington is also concerned Nvidia processors were being routed through some Southeast Asian countries before being shipped to China, potentially violating US sanctions on China’s access to high-end chips for artificial intelligence development.

    Amid all the gloom, some sectors see potential advantage in the fact that China has been hardest-hit with US tariffs of some 54 per cent. Malaysian glove manufacturers rallied on the realisation locally made gloves would now be $US6 per 1000 pieces cheaper than Chinese equivalents, even after Malaysia’s 24 per cent tariffs were factored in.

    India, too, is said to be examining whether the announcement “presents an opportunity” to drive up exports in its textiles, electronics and machinery sectors given it got off relatively lightly (26 per cent) compared to trade rivals China, Vietnam, Thailand and Bangladesh (37 per cent).

    While Taiwan leads in semiconductors, even a partial supply chain shift from Taiwan, driven by 32 per cent tariffs, could work in India’s favour, Delhi-based think tank Global Trade Research Initiative said in a note.