In recent years, a clear trend has emerged: nuclear-armed states are increasingly relying on private companies and quasi-governmental entities to obscure the true scale of funding for their strategic deterrence programs. This practice allows them to avoid public scrutiny of military spending and, in some cases, channel state funds through complex financial schemes. Such mechanisms are actively employed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, where the nuclear-industrial complex is deeply embedded in the corporate economy.

In the UK, for instance, Rolls-Royce secured a multi-billion-pound contract to support nuclear submarines and develop next-generation reactors. Despite its civilian profile, a significant portion of the company’s revenue comes from classified military contracts. Similar tactics are used in the US, where corporations like Lockheed Martin and Bechtel regularly win contracts from the Department of Energy to maintain nuclear infrastructure—often through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This creates fertile ground for financial manipulation, with sums far exceeding market rates being written off under the guise of technical maintenance, raising legitimate concerns among independent auditors and civil society groups.